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Abstract 
 
Financialisation research has originally focussed on the US experience, but the concept is now 
increasingly applied to emerging economies (EMEs). There is a rich literature stressing 
peculiarities of individual country experiences, but little systematic comparison across EMEs. 
This paper fills this gap, providing an overview of the debate and identifying six 
financialisation interpretations for EMEs. These different interpretations stress (1) financial 
deregulation (2) foreign financial inflows, (3) asset price volatility, (4) the shift from bank-
based to market-based finance, (5) business debt, and (6) household indebtedness. We 
construct and compare measures of the six financialisation interpretations across a sample of 
17 EMEs from Latin America, emerging Europe, Africa and Asia, contrasting them with the 
US and UK, two financialised economies. 
We find considerable variation in financialisation experiences of EMEs. Asset price volatility 
is found across continents. Asia has been more exposed to capital inflows, stock markets have 
gained importance and private sector debt risen. In emerging Europe financial deregulation 
has been more pronounced with lower levels but strong increases in household debt. The 
picture is similar in South Africa, the African EME in the sample, where household debt is 
comparatively high. Financialisation in Latin America is weaker according to our measures.   
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Financialisation in Emerging Economies: A Systematic Overview and 
Comparison with Anglo-Saxon Economies  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘financialisation’ was coined in the early 1990s1 and has since been interpreted in 
varying ways, resulting in different research strands across a range of academic disciplines, 
including economics, sociology and geography. Financialisation research initially centred on 
the US economy. While the geographical focus of the research agenda has widened over time, 
a bias towards rich countries remains. Literature on financialisation in emerging and 
developing countries gradually developed in the context of Latin American countries, parts of 
emerging Europe, South Africa and some East Asian ‘tigers’. Similar to the literature on 
financialisation in advanced economies, research on financialisation among emerging market 
economies (EMEs) focuses on changes within a specific country over time (see, for instance, 
Rethel, 2010; Correa, Vidal, & Marshall, 2012; Ashman & Fine, 2013) or the changing nature 
of an economic sector (e.g. non-financial companies, NFCs) in a small number of countries 
(Demir, 2009; Becker, Jäger, Leubolt, & Weissenbacher, 2010). Thus, much of the research 
on EME financialisation offers longitudinal analysis but there are few cross-country 
comparisons.  
Interpretations of the term ‘financialisation’ can vary widely. The working definition of the 
phenomenon used by many economists is Epstein's (2005, p. 3) broad understanding of 
financialisation as ‘the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors 
and financial institutions in the operations of the domestic and international economies’. 
While a broad definition allows for a rich research agenda, it also means that many different 
interpretations of the phenomenon co-exist.  
                                                        
1
 Foster (2007) argues that the term was either coined by Arrighi (1994) in his The Long Twentieth Century or by 
Phillips (1994) in Arrogant Capital which contains a chapter dedicated to ‘The Financialization of America’.   
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This paper focuses on the financialisation literature dealing with EMEs
2
. The aim of the paper 
is to outline different interpretations of financialisation in EMEs that exist in the literature, 
rather than providing a detailed account of the various research strands in the broader 
financialisation debate (see Karwowski, Shabani & Stockhammer (2016) for an exposition 
and assessment). We identify six such interpretations that can be quantified: (1) Financial 
deregulation
3
 and the integration of EMEs into the global financial system drives 
financialisation in these countries. (2) Foreign financial inflows result in financialisation in 
EMEs. (3) Financial liberalisation encourages asset price inflation in EMEs, which is an 
important aspect of financialisation. (4) The shift from a bank-based to a market-based 
financial system causes financialisation in EMEs. Financialisation in EMEs is often 
characterised as country-specific, but the uniqueness of financialisation experiences is 
expressed comparatively to the US, the archetypal financialised economy. Two more 
interpretations emerge from this comparison: (5) Debt levels among businesses in EMEs have 
been seen with concern as sign of financialisation. (6) The increased involvement of 
households in finance, e.g. strongly rising indebtedness of individuals, characterises 
household financialisation.  
We have constructed a sample of 17 countries that fall into the category of EMEs. Guided by 
existing financialisation work but limited by data availability our sample covers the three 
Latin American EMEs Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. From emerging Europe we included 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. South Africa is the only African 
economy considered. Finally, apart from China we assess the following Asian countries in our 
analysis: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and South Korea. 
                                                        
2
 While some work refers to the financialisation of developing and emerging economies (such as Bonizzi, 2013), 
the actual focus of this research agenda are EMEs, i.e. middle-income countries. Many developing (i.e. poor) 
countries have such rudimentary financial systems that it would be difficult to speak of their financialisation, 
which implies both a certain size as well as sophistication of the financial sector.  
3
 We use the terms ‘financial deregulation’ and ‘financial liberalisation’ interchangeably. We measure two 
distinct interpretations of financialisations linked to deregulation. First, we account for financial reforms 
(captured by the financial reform index) and second, we measure the extent of foreign financial inflows which 
are facilitated by deregulation. 
 4 
 
Our paper complements earlier studies that focus on specific countries or sectors that are 
impacted by financialisation over time. We evaluate financialisation across our sample 
countries in two time periods: the decade before the financial crisis (1997-2007) and the most 
recent years (2008-2015). While the former years are often understood as a period of 
accelerating financialisation, the debate on financialisation in China, for instance, has only 
emerged in the latter period (Chong, 2012; PwC, 2014).  
The contribution of the paper is a cross-country comparison of the financialisation 
experiences in 17 EMEs along the lines of the six identified financialisation interpretations. 
We have constructed six measures that capture the different interpretations. Using these six 
indicators, we assess the relative positions of EMEs among themselves. We also compare the 
17 EMEs more generally to the positions of the US and the UK since the two Anglo-Saxon 
countries are typically understood as the benchmark of a financialised economy.  
Overall, we find that the indicators used to capture the six interpretations of financialisation 
illustrate the heterogeneity of financialisation across EMEs. There is a substantial variation 
among EMEs’ experiences: While Asia has not experienced strong financial deregulation, 
especially East Asian economies have been more exposed to financial inflows. Stock markets 
have become more important in the region and debt levels in the private sector are relatively 
high. Asset price volatility, which can be found across all regions, has been strong in many 
Asian EMEs. In comparison to Asia, financial deregulation was more pronounced in 
emerging Europe and South Africa. Here asset price volatility has also been strong and 
household debt has either increased substantially or been comparatively high in recent years. 
For Latin America our six financialisation measures are more moderate.  
Our findings illustrate that an understanding of financialisation as entirely externally driven is 
overly simplistic. Countries that have actively deregulated might experience household 
financialisation and asset price inflation without being exposed to strong foreign capital 
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inflows (e.g. South Africa). Hence, domestic institutions and internal dynamics have to be 
studied carefully to understand the differences in financialisation trajectories among EMEs 
(as argued by Rethel, 2010, for Malaysia; see also Becker et al., 2010).   
The paper is structured as follows: the subsequent section provides an overview of the most 
salient research strands on EME financialisation, from which we distil six financialisation 
interpretations. Section 3 introduces our sample countries and the financialisation indicators 
capturing the six interpretations. In section 4 we systematically analyse financialisation 
among the 17 EMEs and in comparison to the US and UK, i.e. the two most financialised 
countries. Finally, section 5 summarises our findings and concludes. 
 
2. Financialisation in emerging economies: A literature review 
 
The research agenda on financialisation in EMEs developed only in recent years, remaining a 
nascent area of research (see Bonizzi, 2013 for a detailed survey). Attempts to address 
financialisation can mainly be found within heterodox economics and economic sociology. In 
the case of EME financialisation much of the existing research is part of either the post-
Keynesian (Demir, 2007, 2009; Correa, Vidal, & Marshall, 2012), Marxist (Ashman, Fine, & 
Newman, 2011; Lapavitsas, 2013) or Institutionalist tradition (such as the regulationist 
school, Becker et al., 2010). These heterodox approaches, which often inspire and 
conceptually borrow from each other, are in stark contrast to mainstream economics. 
Mainstream, i.e. neoclassical, economists understand financial markets generally as efficient 
and individual agents as rational. Mainstream economics has a more radical, New Classical 
wing, which regards clearing markets as the normal feature of actual economies and a New 
Keynesian version, which regards market failures and price rigidities as widespread in reality. 
By contrast, in heterodox economics instability is inherent to financial markets and capitalist 
societies more broadly. For instance, post-Keynesians stress fundamental uncertainty of 
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agents in their decisions, the tendency towards speculation among financial investors, the pro-
cyclicality of credit extension, favouring asset price bubbles, and the consequent need and 
rush to liquidity during crises. Marxists additionally emphasise how power relations and class 
impact economic interaction. Institutionalist analysis focuses on how institutions – be they 
organisations, conventions or rules more generally – shape economic interaction. 
While heterodox economists are very critical of financialisation, warning of its adverse 
impact on financial stability, income distribution and productive investment, the mainstream 
either does not engage with the phenomenon or reduces it to ‘financial deepening’, i.e. the 
development of financial markets and instruments. For example, the accounting firm PwC 
(2014), representative for mainstream thinking, has pronounced financialisation as a $9 
trillion opportunity for China and six other EMEs
4
 because this is the sum it would take in 
loan extension to match the credit-to-GDP ratios in the rich G7 countries
5
. By contrast, 
heterodox approaches see a larger financial sector as a mixed blessing: it enables more 
productive investment, but also allows for more speculation and is a source of systemic 
instability. In EMEs the financialisation phenomenon is believed to take on characteristics 
distinct from financialisation in rich countries (Becker et al., 2010). For one, financialisation 
is often characterised as externally driven (see for instance Powell (2013) on ‘subordinate 
financialisation’). And secondly, country-specific incarnations of financialisation are stressed 
and often contrasted with the US experience.  
Research on financialisation in EMEs is situated in the context of older debates between 
mainstream and heterodox economists on the role of finance in development. In the early 
1970s, Shaw (1973; and Gurley & Shaw, 1955) and McKinnon (1973) put forward the claim 
that financial development fuelled by deregulation would stimulate growth in developing 
countries and EMEs. In the aftermath of World War II, governments around the world 
                                                        
4
 Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey.  
5
 The G7 include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and US. 
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regulated and intervened in financial markets heavily with the aim to encourage credit-
financed investment and trade. Interest rate controls such as caps, i.e. prescribed maximum 
levels of interest rates, were common policy tools in the attempt to encourage capital 
accumulation. As development among poor countries proceeded much more slowly than 
predicted by modernisation theorists (such as Lewis or Rostow), by the 1970s economists and 
policy makers became increasingly disillusioned with the prospects for ‘catching-up’ in the 
developing world (Leys, 1996). Against this background, Shaw and McKinnon formulated the 
‘financial repression’ hypothesis, claiming that interest rates in developing countries and 
EMEs were too low because of interest rate controls, which hampered investment and growth. 
Deregulation was required to liberate financial markets, which would increase interest rates, 
saving among the domestic population and, subsequently, investment. This recommendation 
became a key part of the Washington Consensus
6
; and since the 1980s mainstream 
economists, the World Bank and the IMF have been advising developing countries to reform 
their financial systems, i.e. to reduce government intervention in order to get ‘interest rates 
right’ (Long, 1990, p. 169; World Bank, 1989). 
There are several empirical shortcoming of this approach, even within a mainstream 
framework. First, the sensitivity of saving to interest rates is rather weak (see, for example, 
Giovanni, 1985), which in fact was acknowledged among key proponents of the financial 
repression hypothesis (Shaw, 1973; Fry, 1988). Poor households, i.e. those close to the 
subsistence level of consumption, were found not to react to rising interest rates (Ostry & 
Reinhard, 1992). Thus, in low-income countries saving decisions are mainly determined by 
considerations of subsistence rather than interest rates (Ogaki, Ostry & Reinhard, 1996). 
Second, more recently Rashid (2013) found that in Sub-Saharan Africa financial 
                                                        
6
 In response to the economic and financial crises of the 1980s in many developing and emerging economies the 
IMF and the World Bank developed a ‘standard’ policy package that was prescribed to distressed countries. This 
became known as the Washington Consensus due to the geographical location of the two institutions. At the 
centre of these standard policies are deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and fiscal policy discipline (see 
Williamson, 1990). 
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liberalisation, measured by the IMF’s financial reforms dataset (Abiad, Detragiache, & 
Tressel, 2008), had a negative effect on financial development.  
As a consequence mainstream research on the role of finance in development has bypassed 
the link between financial liberalisation and savings rates: a new research strand emerged in 
the 1990s arguing that financial development, i.e. financial deepening, induces growth. In this 
context, financial liberalisation became known as a policy mix not only targeting the 
elimination of credit controls but also advocating free entry to the financial sector, bank 
autonomy and private ownership of banks and the liberalisation of international capital flows 
(Rashid, 2013). Levine and King (1993) prominenty initiated this research agenda (see also 
Levine, 1997, Levine, 2005, Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen, & Levine, 2012), showing that 
the size of the financial sector, volume and share of credit expanded to domestic NFCs in an 
economy are associated with future growth rates. On this basis, they argued that financial 
deepening stimulates growth. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis it was 
acknowledged that situations can emerge where there is ‘too much’ finance in an economy 
(Cecchetti & Kharroubi, 2012, p. 1). Thus, the current argument is that there is a quadratic 
relationship between finance and growth, an inverted U-curve, describing an optimal level of 
finance that maximises growth. Most EMEs are regarded to be far away from reaching the 
optimal size of their financial sectors, requiring further deepening of their financial markets 
(see Sahay et al., 2015).  
Financialisation research, from the very beginning, has taken a more critical view of the 
impact of financial liberalisation on economic stability. Since much of it is based on post-
Keynesian, Marxist and Institutionalist economic theories, it stresses the destabilising effects 
of financial activity. In advanced economies, financial liberalisation has been identified as an 
important driver behind financialisation. Here, deregulation has led to the rise of institutional 
investors such as insurance companies and pension funds (Clark, 2000; Toporowski, 2000). 
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This is illustrated in the immense growth of financial assets held by institutional investors. 
Pension funds, commercial insurers and investment companies in the US and UK quadrupled 
their assets between the 1980s and 2000s. The figure surged from around 50% of GDP in 
1980 to almost 200% by 2005/6 (Evans, 2009). Deregulation also allowed for the emergence 
of the shadow banking sector, i.e. non-traditional lenders that are less tightly regulated while 
effectively providing credit in the same fashion that banks do (Pozsar, 2008; Adrian & Shin, 
2009; Kessler & Wilhelm, 2013). A similar argument has been made for developing 
countries. Lapavitsas (2009, p. 10) suggested that ‘[t]he beginnings of financialisation in 
developing countries can probably be found in financial liberalisation in the 1970s, which 
lifted price and quantity controls in domestic financial systems’. Correa, Vidal, & Marshall 
(2012) also identified the liberalisation of trade and financial accounts in developing countries 
as origin of financialisation in this part of the world. Hence, our first interpretation of 
financialisation is that the phenomenon is caused by financial liberalisation (or deregulation) 
in EMEs.  
An important aspect of financial liberalisation was the opening up of financial accounts. 
Mainstream economists believed that deregulating restrictions on international capital flows 
would improve efficiency in local financial markets through, for example, increased 
competition of foreign banks in domestic financial markets of developing economies (Levine, 
2004) or foreign participants in domestic equity markets (Bekaert, Harvey & Lundblad, 
2005). Increased efficiency should result in better allocation of resources and higher growth. 
In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, developing and emerging economies increasingly 
subscribed to financial liberalisation, integrating more closely into global financial structures 
(Abiad, Detragiache & Tressel, 2008). This happened not least since financial account 
liberalisation was typically required under the IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment 
packages, implemented in many developing countries as result of mounting exchange rate 
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pressures and foreign-denominated debt burdens (for instance, see Moyo, 2001, for Zambia in 
the 1990s). Financial flows into EMEs picked up over the 1990s and surged in the 2000s 
(Schmuckler, 2004; Aizenman, Jinjarak, & Park, 2011; Nier, Saadi Sedik, & Mondino, 2014). 
Higher interest rates in EMEs made those countries attractive destinations for financial 
investors. Accommodative monetary policy implemented in rich economies in response to the 
financial crisis of 2007/8 and the ensuing protracted stagnation, further entrenched this trend 
(Akyüz, 2015). Surging foreign inflows make developing countries more vulnerable, 
especially when inflows are dominated by short-term portfolio investment, which is prone to 
‘sudden stops’ of inflows as well as their reversals. But similarly, empirical evidence on the 
growth-impact of long-term inflows such as foreign direct inflows (FDI) is mixed (Alfaro, 
Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Sayek, 2010), even though it is praised as source of resources, 
technology and human development among many policy makers and academics (Stiglitz, 
2000).  
The rise in cross-border capital flows and their intensified inflows into EMEs constitute the 
international dimension of financialisation (Stockhammer, 2013). On the one hand, 
developing countries and EMEs are impacted by the financialisation of rich economies 
(McKenzie & Pons-Vignon, 2012). Thus, the surge in international (private-sector) financial 
flows during the 2003-2007 global boom was driven by intensifying financialisation forces 
(Tyson & McKinley, 2014). On the other hand, these flows can also bring financialisation 
dynamics to EMEs, which then play out domestically. For instance, using firm level data 
Demir (2007, 2009) found that capital inflows (portfolio flows and FDI) contributed to 
financialisation in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey, inducing a shift away from productive 
towards more short-term and speculative financial investment among domestic NFCs. For 
Central Eastern Europe (CEE), Gabor (2012) pointed out that the inflow of investment by 
foreign banks contributed to the financialisation of domestic financial systems. A direct result 
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of increased global financial integration is rising exchange rate volatility in EMEs 
(Kaltenbrunner, 2010, 2011). As reaction, many EMEs including China have amassed large 
foreign exchange reserves, effectively subsidising rich countries by holding their low-yielding 
government bonds or currencies (Painceira, 2009). In short, the interpretation of 
financialisation highlighted here is that foreign financial inflows contribute towards the 
phenomenon in EMEs. 
While foreign financial inflows are regarded as driver of efficiency gains by mainstream 
economists, they are viewed as potential source of Minsky-type asset price inflation by 
heterodox economists, especially those writing within a post-Keynesian tradition. Kregel, 
1998; Dymski, 1999; and Arestis & Glickman, 2002 have applied this to the EME experience. 
This strand of research came out of the literature critical of deregulation and financial 
liberalisation and was spurred by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Due to 
liberalised financial accounts the corporate sectors in numerous East Asian economies 
(including Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand) borrowed substantially in 
foreign currency in the run-up to the crisis, which was attractive because of the high interest 
spread between domestic and rich country lending rates. This borrowing was also often short-
term (Corsetti, Pesenti, & Roubini, 1998). The foreign capital inflows were channelled into 
the stock and real estate markets causing prices to rise. Positive feedback effects in reaction to 
increasing prices triggered asset price inflation. Simultaneously, the balance sheets of 
domestic companies became increasingly fragile as debt burdens rise while cash flow did not 
(Cozzi & Toporowski, 2006). In such a situation an exchange rate and financial crisis can be 
triggered easily by a sudden shortfall in income or a revaluation of the exchange rate among 
other events. In this interpretation financialisation is interpreted as inherently linked to asset 
price inflation and volatility since it induces NFCs and other investors to shift from 
accumulation of productive capital to financial and real estate investment. 
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While mainstream economists typically see finance as generic markets across countries with 
few if any differences, research inspired by Institutional approaches emphasises variations in 
financial systems depending on the country and historical background. The creation of a 
typology of different financial markets can be traced back to Gerschenkron’s ideas on the role 
of finance in development (Gerschenkron, 1962). He argued that a bank-based system, i.e. a 
financial system dominated by large banks and their credit extension, was necessary in 
Germany and other lagging industrialisers in order to catch up with Britain’s level of 
development. By contrast, Britain is historically classified as market-based system, where 
capital markets are the most important source of external finance for NFCs. For rich 
economies, there is evidence that since the 1970s financial structures have converged, while 
investment rates have been dampened (Schaberg, 1999), supporting the idea that 
financialisation coincides with a shift from bank-based to market-based finance. Aglietta & 
Breton (2001) argued that after World War II and up to the mid-1970s financial markets were 
subordinated as the financial sector was heavily regulated and dominated by banks. Financial 
liberalisation shifted the balance towards equity markets, contributing to financialisation. For 
EMEs, Lapavitsas (2009) argued that financialisation entails a shift from a bank-based (or 
relational) financial system to a market-based (or arms length) financial system in developing 
countries. He attributed this shift to the Washington Consensus policies (where financial 
liberalisation is an important aspect) as they were promoted by the World Bank and the IMF 
since the 1980s. Other financialisation researchers take a more nuanced view, stressing that 
these changes in financial structures cannot be simplistically understood as externally 
imposed but in fact are also deeply embedded in local institutions (see Rethel, 2010, on 
Malaysia). This gives us another financialisation interpretation, referring to the shift from a 
bank-based to a market-based financial system.    
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While much of the financialisation research in EMEs stresses the distinct characteristics of the 
phenomenon in these economies (see Becker et al., 2010), the US experience remains a clear 
reference point because distinctiveness is typically expressed in contrast to US 
financialisation. In rich countries, the financialisation of the NFC was one of the first foci of 
financialisation research. Here rising NFC debt levels have been identified as potential sign of 
financialisation (Orhangazi, 2008). Following Minsky, the ratio of debt stock to income flow 
is crucial to judge whether an economic unit (such as the firm) can stem the repayment of its 
debt (Minsky, 1975). Rising indebtedness can mean growing financial vulnerability since 
larger volumes of cash flow are required to meet future debt servicing commitments. 
Increased financial vulnerability in turn will dampen NFCs’ investment. The latter has been 
identified a symptom of financialisation, both in rich countries and EMEs (for rich economies 
see Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008; for EMEs see Demir, 2007, 2009). Currently, high 
and rising debt burdens among business in EMEs are becoming a worry among financial 
investors. In particular, the development of debt in Asian economies such as China, India, 
Indonesia and Malaysia are seen with growing concern by credit rating agencies (CBNC, 
2016). Thus, NFC indebtedness is another interpretation of the financialisation phenomenon. 
Household financialisation was also first noted in the context of rich economies, but recently 
there has been concern about rising household indebtedness in EMEs. Some investors – such 
as George Soros – herald that the Chinese economy is on the brink of a major financial crisis 
comparable to the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis in the US (Chang, 2016). As discussed 
above, mainstream economists see rising credit volumes in EMEs often uncritically, arguing 
that – at least as long as the credit-to-GDP ratio is below its optimal level – rising borrowing 
will fuel growth. Heterodox economists distinguish between different types of credit, 
highlighting that especially household credit doesn’t contribute to the expansion of productive 
capacity, but can increase financial fragility. This means that households, in contrast to firms, 
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typically don’t use the borrowed funds to improve their ability to generate cash flow. As 
consequence, sudden declines in collateral values or job loss can result in their inability to 
meet debt servicing commitments. Thus, financialisation research is wary of rising household 
debt burdens (see Karacimen, 2014, for Turkey). For EMEs, dos Santos (2013) and Gabor 
(2012) argue that the entrance of foreign banks and rising foreign ownership of domestic 
banks have resulted in a strong rise in household indebtedness. When facing financialisation 
banks are under pressure to find new clients as NFCs increasingly tap capital markets for 
external financing. Rising household debt is therefore a consequence of financialisation. This 
is another interpretation of financialisation in EMEs.  
There are some aspects of the financialisation debate that we will not be able to cover in our 
empirical analysis either due to data limitations or the macroeconomic angle of this analysis. 
First, as the financialisation literature is inspired by heterodox economics approaches where 
income distribution plays a key role in determining macroeconomic outcomes, there has been 
a keen interest in the distributional implications of financialisation. Jayadev (2007) and 
Stockhammer (2016) provide econometric evidence that financial globalisation has had 
negative impact on the wage share in panel analyses that include advanced economies as well 
as EMEs. Second, post-Keynesians have developed a typology of demand regimes that 
includes wage-led as well as profit-led regimes (Bhaduri & Marglin, 1990), which has been 
extended to include debt-driven and export-driven growth models (Lavoie & Stockhammer, 
2013). Hein and Mundt (2013) apply this framework empirically to the G20 countries and 
classify Mexico as having a debt-led consumption boom, India, South Africa and Turkey as 
domestic demand-led economies and China, Indonesia and Korea as strongly export-led 
mercantilist and Argentina, Brazil and Russia as weakly export-led economies. Third, the 
shareholder value motivation, first observed among rich country corporates, has also been 
increasingly impressed onto EME businesses. For the US, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) 
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analysed how financialisation has changed firm management’s goals towards maximising 
shareholder value in the form of increased dividend payments and share buybacks. 
Stockhammer (2004) provided econometric evidence for several advanced economies that 
increased financial activities of firms had a negative impact on real investment. Authors 
writing in the Marxist tradition argued that NFCs have also been under pressure to generate 
financial profits (Krippner, 2005). In the context of EMEs, integration in global financial 
markets and competition with foreign NFCs have put pressure on domestic NFCs to generate 
financial profits. For Argentina, Mexico and Turkey, Demir (2007, 2009) provided firm-level 
evidence, showing that NFCs in these countries increasingly undertake financial and short-
term, often speculative, investment. Farhi & Borghi (2009) argued that international financial 
integration exposes NFCs in EMEs to global competition, pressuring these companies to 
generate short-term (often speculative) financial profits. Fourth, one of the interesting features 
of the financialisation debate is that it recognizes the endogeneity of the aims (in neoclassical 
terminology: preferences) of the actors. One stream of the research, thus, has investigated 
how the perception of households and individuals changes in the course of financialisation. 
Within a Cultural Political Economy approach and building on Foucauldian analysis Langely 
(2007) has pointed out that subjectivities change due to increasing involvement with financial 
market and internalise a financial self-discipline. 
To summarise we have identified six financialisation interpretations for EMEs based on the 
literature, which can be operationalized empirically for our sample of 19 countries. (1) 
Financialisation is the result of financial deregulation. (2) Foreign financial inflows can cause 
financialisation. (3) Asset price inflation encourages financialisation. (4) The shift towards a 
market-based financial system is the origin of financialisation. (5) NFCs increasingly engage 
with financial markets, experiencing rising debt burdens. (6) High and rising household debt 
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is a sign of the financialisation of the household. The next section will outline the 
financialisation indicators we have compiled to capture these six interpretations. 
 
3. Financialisation indicators: Sample countries and data sources 
 
 
Our country sample consists of 17 EMEs plus the two financialised economies: US and UK. 
The term EME is not well defined in the literature, loosely referring to middle-income 
economies that are undergoing economic transformation, for instance, from planned to free-
market economy (Kvint, 2009). The choice of our EME sample was guided by the 
financialisation literature but restricted by data availability. The literature has identified 
economies in Latin America as financialised, especially Argentina (Ciblis & Allami, 2013), 
Brazil (Barbosa-Filho, 2005; Rossi, 2013) and Mexico (Correa et al., 2012; Powell, 2013). 
Emerging Europe is another geographical focus of financialisation research. Here we have 
included Central European (CE) countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, as 
well as Russia (Gabor, 2012) and Turkey (Akyüz & Boratav, 2005; Karacimen, 2014). The 
three former economies together with Russia are collectively referred to as the Central 
Eastern European (CEE) countries in our sample.  
From the African continent only South Africa was considered since there are few signs of 
financialisation among other African economies (Ashman, Mohamed & Newman, 2013). 
Finally, from emerging Asia the following countries are part of the sample alongside China: 
the East Asian economies of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia (Rethel, 2010), Singapore 
(Daniels, 2015), South Korea and Thailand as well as India. For this study Hong Kong is 
particularly important. The city state has been in the analytical focus of research on global 
financial centres (Wójcik & Burger, 2010; Zeyun & Sheikh Dawood, 2016). Additionally, 
Hong Kong became an autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China in 1997. This 
tightened the links between the city state and the other large Chinese financial centre, 
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Shanghai. Thus, a discussion of financialisation dimensions emergent in China necessitates 
the analysis of Hong Kong’s financial structures.  
To illuminate the degree of financialisation in EMEs with respect to the six interpretations 
discussed in section 2 we have compiled six indicators for the countries in our sample, using 
data from international institutions to ensure the comparability of the figures. These are 
summarised in table 1 below. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains information about data 
sources and availability for each indicator.  
Table 1. Interpretations of financialisation in emerging economies 
Financialisation interpretation Indicator 
Financial deregulation Financial reform index 
Foreign financial inflows Stock of foreign liabilities (portfolio 
investment, FDI and other financial inflows) 
Asset price volatility Real house price indices (2010 = 100), 
coefficient of variation 
Shift to market-based finance Ratio: stock market value traded (% GDP)/ 
bank credit (% GDP) 
NFC financialisation NFC debt (% of GDP) 
Household financialisation Household debt (% of GDP) 
 
To measure the extent of financial deregulation we use the IMF financial reform index (Abiad 
et al., 2008). The index ranges between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating more advanced 
financial liberalisation. Thus, both Anglo-Saxon economies in the sample reached a financial 
reform index of 1 by the late 1990s, indicating complete deregulation of their financial 
sectors. The extent of foreign capital inflows present in our sample countries is measured by 
the stock of foreign liabilities (including portfolio, foreign direct and other financial 
investment) present as share of GDP. The inclusion of FDI is justified since financialisation 
can take hold of EMEs as domestic NFCs or banks emulate financial practices of foreign 
companies that are financialised. The data were obtained from the Lane & Milesi-Feretti 
database (Lane & Ferretti, 2011).  
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Asset price inflation is captured through real house price indices sourced from the Bank of 
International Settlement (BIS). We focus on house prices rather than other measures of asset 
prices such as equity prices due to ease of data availability. When inflationary pressures (i.e. a 
bubble) in the housing market tip house price deflation can be triggered. Hence, it is not 
merely the high level of house prices that is alarming but more so the large volatility of house 
prices, the result of inflation combined with deflation of asset prices. Therefore, we consider 
the coefficient of variation
7
 of real house prices. This is a standard measure of volatility for 
financial investors, expressing the dispersion of prices as percentage of their mean value.    
The nature of the financial system (i.e. whether it is more bank- or more market-based) in the 
sample countries is assessed using the World Bank’s activity indicator. The measure is the 
ratio of value traded on the domestic stock exchange (expressed as share of GDP) and the 
share of outstanding credit in total GDP. An activity measure above 1 is usually interpreted 
economy is more market-based because the activity in capital markets is stronger relative to 
bank lending. While the use of this indicator is rather standard in the literature (e.g. Čihák et 
al 2012), there are problems with this interpretation: most stock market trading is secondary 
trading and an increased market value can have little impact on NFC’s financial position. 
Conversely an increase in bank lending can finance speculative activities.  
The financialisation of NFCs is evaluated using data on NFC debt as ratio of GDP. The ratio 
provides an indication of how much NFCs are exposed to the financial sector through 
borrowing. Due to limited data availability we can’t obtain figures on debt-to-cash flow ratios 
for NFCs in our sample countries. The debt-to-GDP ratio for NFCs is a good proxy of NFCs’ 
financial vulnerability given that higher debt ratios will require more resources to be paid off. 
The data were obtained from the BIS database. Finally, figures on the level of household debt 
(as share of GDP), which is a measure of household financialisation, were sourced from the 
                                                        
7
 The coefficient of variation (CV) is defined as the ratio of standard deviation (σ) to expected value (μ): 𝑐𝑣 = 
𝜎
𝜇
. 
The CV is a scale-invariant measure, which is advantageous when assessing volatility (Allison, 1978).   
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BIS. Ideally, household debt should be assessed as share of disposable household income to 
obtain a picture about the sustainability of this debt. Data availability limits our study once 
again, only allowing for an analysis of household debt data as share of GDP. These figures are 
useful, nonetheless, since they give an indication of the size of household debt in relation to 
aggregate income in the economy, coming close to a Minsky-type analysis.  
Our sample is constraint by data availability and our aim to include several financialisation 
measures, both in terms of the time period and the countries included. The period studied runs 
from 1997, when the East Asian financial crisis hit, to 2015, the most recent year for which 
data are available. For many EMEs, in particular the Eastern European and Asian countries 
financialisation, this time period is suitable to study the six highlighted financialisation 
interpretations. By contrast, for Latin American countries a longer time period, capturing, for 
instance, the international financial flows and financial crises in the region since the 1980s 
would be more desirable.  
We use the global financial crisis as a divider, splitting the period into two: the decade before 
the global financial crisis (1997 to 2007) and its aftermath (2008 to 2015) to allow for 
variation. The decade before the financial crisis was characterised by accelerating 
financialisation (as noted for instance by Tyson & McKinley, 2014, in the context of foreign 
financial inflows into EMEs). Some countries such as China have experienced financialisation 
only in more recent years (i.e. from 2008 onwards). The turmoil in Chinese financial markets 
in 2015/early 2016 sparked a discussion about China’s growing financial sector, introducing 
the issue of financialisation. In this context accommodative monetary policy, embraced by the 
People’s Bank of China in response to the financial turmoil, were seen critically as 
contributing to ‘excessive financialisation’ (Chengsi, 2016).  
In the next section we will consider the average values for the six indicators outlined here for 
the periods 1997-2007 and 2008-2015. Where data for 2015 are not available we will include 
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all available data up to the most recent figures. In one case, for the financial deregulation 
indicator, we cannot evaluate recent developments since the dataset only provides figures up 
to 2005. All data are presented in bar charts for better illustration while exact figures are 
included in table A.2 in the appendix. Where important, growth rates have been included in 
the graphs. All rates of change (i.e. between the 1997-2007 average and the average of the 
most recent period available) are also reported in table A.2. Using these six financialisation 
indicators, the next section will assess the extent of financialisation in 17 EMEs in contrast to 
the US and UK.  
 
4. Assessing financialisation of emerging economies 
 
 
The first interpretation of financialisation to be considered is the degree to which countries 
have implemented financial deregulation. Graph 1 shows the financial reform index across 
our sample for the decade before the financial crisis. Data availability restricts our analysis to 
the period 1997-2005. In the US and UK the financial deregulation process started in the 
1970s, which explains why both countries were virtually completely financially liberalised, 
scoring a financial reform index of 1 (or almost 1 in the case of the US) on average during the 
decade before the financial crisis. In contrast, most of the Asian economies in the sample took 
a more careful approach to financial deregulation, illustrated in financial reform indices rarely 
averaging more than 0.7. Notable exceptions are Singapore (with an average financial reform 
index of 0.92) and Hong Kong (0.94).  
The two city states alongside Hungary (0.94) were according to this indicator almost 
completely financially ‘reformed’ during this period. While Hong Kong and Singapore had 
historically relatively liberalised financial systems, other East Asian economies – such as 
Indonesia (0.62), Thailand (0.64), Malaysia (0.71) and South Korea (0.71) – started 
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deregulation efforts during the 1980s
8
  which crucially contributed to the outbreak of the East 
Asian crisis in 1997/8 (Arestis & Glickman, 2002). China was hardly affected by the crisis 
and in fact, despite some financial reforms under way the government still exercises much 
more substantial controls over the domestic banking sector than its EME peers (Prasad, 2016), 
illustrated in an average financial reform index of 0.37 for the period 1997-2005. 
Graph 1. Financial deregulation of selected EMEs, US, UK (1997-2005 average)  
Source: (Abiad et al., 2008). 
India (0.55) and Brazil (0.54) appear similarly cautious with respect to financial deregulation. 
In contrast, the CE countries in our sample – i.e. the Czech Republic (0.86), Hungary (0.94) 
and Poland (0.84) – along with Mexico (0.89) and South Africa (0.85) undertook fast 
financial liberalisation during the 1990s, bringing these economies close to a fully liberalised 
regime by 2005 when the dataset ends. Argentina (0.74) rolled back some of its financial 
liberalisation in the early 2000s as reaction to the 2001 crisis, being one of two EME 
                                                        
8
 South Korea started even earlier, in 1978 (Arestis & Glickman, 2002). 
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countries in the sample (alongside Thailand) that did not see a steady progression in financial 
sector deregulation.  
Financial deregulation is closely linked to capital account liberalisation, allowing for freer 
entry and exit of foreign capital into a country. Graph 2 shows the stock of foreign liabilities 
present in the sample countries for the periods 1997-2007 and the most recent years, i.e. 2008-
2011, on average. Singapore, together with Hong Kong, hosts foreign capital, which amounts 
to a multiple of the country’s output. Between 2008 and 2011 on average the stock of foreign 
investment in Singapore was worth 727% of GDP.  
Graph 2. Foreign liability stock for selected EMEs, US, UK (1997-2007 and 2008-2011 
averages) 
 
Source: Lane & Ferretti, 2011.  
 
FDI was central for Singapore’s industrialisation success, explaining the high figure. In the 
case of Hong Kong (hosting foreign investment averaging almost 700% of GDP for 2008-11), 
it is mostly foreign financial investment that account for the large volume of foreign 
liabilities. In relationship to GDP, the two Asian city states dwarf stocks of foreign financial 
inflows that the US hosts (114% of GDP) while the UK comes close to their levels (453% of 
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GDP). At the face of it, financial deregulation and liberalisation of the capital account have 
moved together. Singapore, Hong Kong and Hungary ranked as the top three EMEs with 
respect to financial deregulation are also the three EMEs that have accumulated most of the 
stock in foreign liabilities in the sample. The countries that were most cautious with financial 
deregulation have also received the smallest volumes of foreign financial liabilities relative to 
their GDP. China’s exposure to foreign financial inflows is the smallest in our sample, 
reaching merely 38% of GDP on average for 2008-2011. The figures, however, don’t suggest 
that financial liberalisation necessarily attracts foreign financial inflows. While Mexico 
figured among the top financially deregulated EMEs, its stock of portfolio investment and 
FDI (60% of GDP) is smaller than Brazil’s (61% of GDP).  
Hong Kong, where deregulation and foreign inflows are more pronounced, could provide an 
entry point for financialisation into China. Since 2000 Chinese authorities have allowed for 
selective deregulation of the financial system and liberalisation of capital flows. Especially in 
recent years this opening up has strengthened the ties between Hong Kong and Shanghai, the 
prime mainland stock exchange. For instance, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 
introduced in 2014 enables foreign investors to buy selected Shanghai-listed stocks, while 
allowing Chinese investors to buy Hang Seng-listed equity. Since 2015 eligible mainland and 
Hong Kong-based mutual funds can also be purchased in both markets (Prasad, 2016). As 
these changes are relatively recent, their impact could not have been reflected in neither of the 
two indicators presented so far. 
In recent years, house price volatility has been particularly strong in EMEs, much stronger 
than in the Anglo-Saxon markets. Graph 3 depicts the volatility of house prices for our sample 
with volatility during the most recent years (2008-2015), increasing as we read the bar chart 
from left to right. For the most recent years (2008-2015), volatility in house prices remains 
present in Hong Kong (23%) and Russia (18%) but has subsided notably in the Anglo-Saxon 
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economies and South Africa. In our sample, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Hungary and Poland all 
experienced relatively higher volatility with coefficients of variation exceeding 10% during 
the latest years. In contrast, China (with a coefficient of variation of 3%) alongside South 
Korea (1%), Mexico (2%), Indonesia (3%), Thailand (3%) and South Africa (4%) saw 
relatively lower volatility in their housing markets since 2008.  
For the decade before the financial crisis, volatility in house prices was particularly noticeable 
in South Africa (with a coefficient of variation of 42%), Russia (38%), the UK (29%), Hong 
Kong (25%), the US (22%) and Poland (16%). While the US subprime mortgage crisis 
received the most medial and academic attention, inflation in real house prices in EMEs like 
South Africa in fact outpaced price growth in the US and UK (see Karwowski, 2015, for 
South Africa). This high level of asset price volatility in EMEs is alarming. Given that these 
countries are poorer than the US/UK their ability to cope with the adverse effects of house 
price bubbles is also more limited. 
Graph 3. House price volatility in selected EMEs, US, UK (1997-2007 and 2008-2015 
averages) 
 
Source: BIS, 2016. 
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Another interpretation of financialisation in EMEs, highlights the shift from bank-based to 
market-based finance as the central characteristic. Graph 4 below shows the relative 
importance of market-based versus bank-based (MB vs. BB) activities in the sample 
countries. During 2008-2014, alongside the US (with a MB vs. BB indictor of 1.37), Hong 
Kong (3.48), South Korea (1.39), India (1.11) and Singapore (1.1) possess a financial system, 
which is dominated by capital markets as the activity indicator is above 1 (see graph 4, left-
hand scale (LHS)). This means that the turnaround in capital markets is larger than bank 
credit expanded. According to this measure, CEE and Latin America countries in the sample 
possess a more bank-based system. The activity measure of market-based activity (versus 
bank-based activity) more than doubled in China between the two time periods considered, as 
can be seen on the right-hand scale (RHS) in graph 4. A similar trend can be observed for 
Hong Kong, which has reached levels of market-based activity by far exceeding those in the 
US, typically seen as the archetypal market-based system.  
Graph 4. MB vs. BB indicator for selected EMEs, US, UK (1997-2007 and 2008-2014 
average)  
 
Note: The averages (1997-2007 and 2008-2011) for the MB-BB activity measure are indicated on the left-hand 
scale (LHS), while the percentage change in the indicator between the two decades is shown on the right-hand 
scale (RHS). Source: World Bank, 2013. 
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For rich economies researchers writing in the post-Keynesian and Marxist tradition have 
argued that NFCs are increasingly engulfed in financialisation, dampening real investment. 
We use NFC debt-to-GDP ratios to proxy for businesses’ exposure to financial vulnerability 
(see graph 5). Countries are arranged from those with the lowest debt burden as share of GDP 
(on the left) in 2008-2015, moving along the horizontal axis to those with the highest 
indebtedness (on the right). NFCs in East Asian economies, especially in Hong Kong (176% 
of GDP), China (131%), South Korea (104%) and Singapore (69%), have the highest debt-to-
GDP ratios, with the exception of Singapore all exceeding corporate debt in the UK (86%) 
and also in the US (69%).  
Graph 5. NFC debt as share of GDP for selected EMEs, US, UK (1997-2007 and 2008-
2015 averages) 
 
Source: BIS, 2016. 
Debt levels in Malaysia (61%), India (50%), Thailand (47%) and especially Indonesia (17%) 
are, however, more moderate. The Latin American economies in our sample have, by 
contrast, much lower debt-to-GDP ratios. In Argentina aggregate debt of NFCs merely 
amounts to 13% on average for the years 2008-2015, while the figure reaches 18% in Mexico 
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and 40% in Brazil. These low levels of NFC liabilities are a reflection of the difficult access 
to finance in Latin America, especially in comparison to East Asia and CE (see, for instance, 
the Milken Institute’s capital access index, Barth, Li, Lu, & Yago, 2010). NFC debt burdens 
in emerging Europe are mostly moderate, ranking from 39% debt-to-GDP in Turkey with 
only slightly higher ratios in Poland (41%), Russia (48%) and the Czech Republic (54%). 
Hungary is a notable exception where NFCs in aggregate were more indebted than in the UK 
in relation to GDP, carrying debt worth 92%. Here as well as in Russia and Turkey NFC debt 
grew by more than 60% between the two periods of analysis, showing a strong increase in 
corporate debt. 
High and rising levels of household indebtedness are another concern of financialisation 
research. Graph 6 shows household debt as share of GDP for our sample of EMEs, the US 
and UK. The two Anglo-Saxon economies possess household debt-to-GDP ratios far larger 
than most of the EMEs in our sample. Namely, household debt in the UK during the years 
2008-2015 was on average 92% of GDP while the figure was 87% for the US. The only EME 
that comes close to this level is South Korea with a household debt-to-GDP ratio of 79%. 
Four East Asian countries follow suit, albeit at markedly lower levels: Malaysia with 61%, 
Hong Kong with 59%, Thailand with 58% and Singapore with 51%.  
Emerging Europe tends to possess much lower household debt, not exceeding one third of 
total GDP in CE: Poland (33%), Hungary (33%), the Czech Republic (29%); and even lower 
in Turkey (18%) and Russia (14%). The Latin American economies in the sample are less 
exposed to household debt (Brazil: 20%, Mexico: 14%, Argentina: 5%), once again this is 
likely to be related to access to finance more generally. In recent years, China has caught up 
with the CE countries in terms of household debt, reaching a household debt-to-GDP ratio of 
28% of GDP for 2008-2015 on average. All of emerging Europe has seen phenomenal growth 
rates in household debt. In Turkey and Russia household debt more than tripled between 
1997-2007 and 2008-2015, growing by 330% and 326%, respectively. In Poland the 
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household debt burden doubled (growing by exactly 200%), while it increased by a factor of 
ca. 1.5 in Hungary (152% growth) and the Czech Republic (142% growth). Thus, although 
household debt remains at a low level in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon economies and 
many of the East Asian countries, household debt has expanded rapidly in emerging Europe. 
This raises concern about financialisation in these economies, which could be spurred by 
entry of foreign banks (Gabor, 2012; dos Santos, 2013) 
Graph 6. Household debt as share of GDP in selected EMEs, US, UK (1997-2007 and 
2008-2015 averages) 
 
Source: BIS, 2016. 
Similar trends in household debt expansion, albeit less pronounced, can be observed in China 
and Brazil where household indebtedness on average rose by 89% and 119% between the 
1997-2007 period and the most recent years (2008-2015). Hence, while overall debt burdens 
stayed low their growth should be monitored with care. 
Summarising the findings of our assessment, we have ranked the countries in the sample from 
most to least financialised according to the six financialisation interpretations found in the 
literature. Table 2 provides this overview, using all available data (i.e. 1997-2015 or most 
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recent year). Countries are arranged by quartiles, ranging from a ‘high’ extent of 
financialisation in comparison to other sample countries, over ‘medium high’ (labelled 
‘mhigh’), medium low (labelled ‘mlow’) to a low extent of financialisation (‘mlow’). The 
table also groups our sample countries according to their geographical region, which is 
specified in the first column. Our six measures confirm that there is a large degree of 
heterogeneity among EMEs in their financialisation experiences since very few countries rank 
consistently high or low. The Anglo-Saxon economies, by contrast, show up as financialised 
across these measures, especially. The US and UK rank high or medium high on all six 
interpretations. This makes them indeed good benchmarks for comparison. In that sense, the 
chosen measures reflect the debate on EME financialisation well, which tends to stress 
country-specific developments while comparing them to the Anglo-Saxon experience.  
Table 2. Overview of six financialisation dimensions by quartile (1997-2015 averages or 
latest data) 
 
The two city states among the EMEs, i.e. Hong Kong and Singapore, consistently rank high 
or medium high on all six measures of financialisation just like the Anglo-Saxon economies. 
In fact, Hong Kong even appears more financialised than the US and UK according to the six 
measures since it is the only country that makes part of the top quartile in each of our 
Region Country Financial 
deregulation
Foreign financial 
inflows
Asset price 
volatility
MB vs. BB 
financial system
NFC debt Household 
debt
Argentina mlow mhigh low low low
Brazil low low high mhigh mlow mlow
Mexico mhigh low low mlow low mlow
Czech Republic mhigh mhigh low low mhigh mlow
Hungary high high mlow mlow high mhigh
Poland mhigh mlow mlow low mlow mlow
Russia mhigh mlow high mhigh mlow low
Turkey mlow mlow mlow high low low
Africa South Africa mhigh mlow high mlow mlow mhigh
China low low low mhigh high mhigh
Hong Kong high high high high high high
India low low mhigh mhigh mlow low
Indonesia low mhigh mlow mlow low mlow
Malaysia mlow mhigh mhigh low mhigh high
Singapore high high mhigh high mhigh mhigh
South Korea mlow mlow mlow high high high
Thailand mlow mhigh low mlow mhigh mhigh
UK high high mhigh mhigh high high
US high high mhigh high mhigh high
Latin America
Emerging 
Europe
Asia
Anglo-Saxon 
countries
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financialisation rankings. This is a reflection of its role as financial centre for Asia. 
Comparing geographical regions, East Asia is particularly exposed to financialisation. Here, 
house price volatility has been high and foreign financial inflows are especially strong. There 
are signs of an increasing importance of financial markets in external financing, while both, 
NFC and household debt burdens are relatively high. Paradoxically, financial deregulation has 
not been as pronounced as in other EMEs (e.g. CEE). Emerging Europe, by contrast, has 
liberalised its financial markets much more strongly. The region experienced asset price 
inflation together with a dramatic surge in household indebtedness and a rise in NFC debt, 
albeit both from a relatively low base. However, foreign capital inflows were more moderate 
in CEE. A similar picture emerges in South Africa where deregulation was swift, asset price 
volatility strong and household debt levels relatively high. Foreign capital inflows have not 
played such an important role in the African economy. Thus, an understanding of 
financialisation as mainly externally driven and imposed, for instance through capital inflows 
(see Lapavitsas, 2009), is too simplistic. The role of domestic institutions and internal 
dynamics has to be studied carefully to understand the different financialisation trajectories in 
EMEs (as argued by Becker et al., 2010).   
Generally, Latin American economies have seen relatively weaker financialisation according 
to the six measures surveyed, which is somewhat surprising given the large body of research 
focusing on this geographical area. This shows that our analysis is complementary to studies 
of changing financial structures in countries over time. The work presented here outlines the 
relative intensity of specific financialisation interpretations across EMEs. As such its strength 
is to establish a framework for comparison among EMEs, highlighting those countries that are 
potentially under-researched despite important signs of financialisation being present. 
With respect to China, we find relatively few reasons to be alarmed about the financialisation 
of the Chinese economy. In this sense, we agree with assessments that don’t see China taking 
a neoliberal turn (which would include a turn towards financialisation) (Lo, 2016). The 
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connections with Hong Kong should be studied carefully since city state could introduce 
financialisation to China.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper has surveyed the financialisation debate on EMEs, identified six interpretations of 
financialisation and presented empirical measures for these for 17 EME and compared them 
to the US and UK. Finance plays a prominent role in both, the mainstream and the 
financialisation debate. The latter is mostly based on post-Keynesian, Marxist and 
Institutionalist theories and economic sociology. While mainstream economics typically 
highlights the efficiency of financial markets and regards financial instability as the results of 
market failure, most non-mainstream economic theories see the financial sector as 
intrinsically unstable. The post-Keynesian approach appears particularly fruitful for the 
analysis of financialisation because it emphasises fundamental uncertainty, resulting in rushes 
to liquidity in times of crisis, the tendency towards speculation among financial investors, the 
pro-cyclicality of credit extension and the possibility of asset price bubbles. As consequence, 
post-Keynesians are sceptical about the effects of financial inflows, which tend to impact 
asset prices rather than real investment and are prone to sudden stops.  
Most of the financialisation debate has centred on the US experience of financialisation, but 
there is a growing literature on financialisation in EMEs. Compared to the debate on 
advanced economies discussions on EMEs have had a prominent role for capital inflows in 
economic instability, in part reflecting the experience of the Latin American countries of the 
1980s and the Asian economies in the late 1990s. While there is a debate on the relative 
weight of external and domestic factors, there is an agreement that capital account 
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liberalisation has had a profound impact on EMEs. Authors like Lapavitsas (2009) stress 
external factors as main determinants, Becker et al. (2010) and Rethel (2010) emphasise that 
external effects interact with domestic institutions and power relations in complex ways.  
We have compiled six measures of financialisation that correspond to different interpretations 
within the financialisation debate. These included the key role of financial deregulation, 
foreign capital inflows, the volatility of asset prices, the relative size of banks versus stock 
markets and the degree of indebtedness of businesses and of households. We found a 
substantial variation within the EMEs’ experience. EMEs mostly rank lower than the US or 
the UK on these indicators with the important exception of house price volatility. Here, EMEs 
across geographic regions have sometimes experienced stronger and often more persistent 
volatility than the Anglo-Saxon countries. This is alarming given the more limited resources 
of EMEs to deal with adverse effects resulting from asset price bubbles.  
There are some patterns that can be distilled across continents. Asia, especially East Asia, has 
been more exposed to financial inflows, stock markets have become more important in the 
region, while debt levels (both for households and NFCs) are relatively high. Emerging 
Europe has very actively deregulated its financial sectors, experiencing asset price bubbles 
and a strong surge in household indebtedness together with growth in business debt. South 
Africa’s experience was similar to emerging Europe’s except that corporate debt levels 
remained relatively low. Latin America (Brazil, in our sample) was also exposed to asset price 
inflation over the past two decades. However, other financialisation measures appear more 
moderate in comparison to Asia and CEE. This finding is somewhat surprising given the large 
body of financialisation research for Latin America, while financialisation in Asia and CEE is 
comparatively under-researched.  
There are concrete insights from our findings that are relevant to policy makers. Thus, our 
analysis lends support to the heterodox perspective on the role of finance in development. 
While mainstream analysis stresses potential long-term growth effects from financial 
 33 
 
deregulation, heterodox economists are more sceptical cautioning of potential risks from 
financial growth. For instance, the volatility of house prices is a concern across EMEs. Hence, 
policy makers should be more wary of potential asset price inflation. Equally, debt levels – be 
they of firms or household – should be monitored carefully especially in relation to income to 
assess the sustainability of debt burdens. 
For future research several questions arise. First, we have identified six interpretations of 
financialisation. An important question is whether these measures do reflect distinct 
financialisation processes or whether they merely map different dimensions of the same 
socio-economic process. To address this question future research should investigate the 
correlation among financialisation measures. Second, the question arises whether those six 
interpretation are of equal relevance and explanatory power. Future research should analyse 
the determinants of the financialisation measures and whether they help explain changes in 
economic performance and income distribution.  
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Appendix 
Tabel A.1. Financialisation interpretations: Data coverage 
 
 
Indicator Coverage
Financial reform index 1997-2005
Stock of foreign liabilities (portfolio investment, 
FDI and other financial inflows)
1997-2011
Real house price indices (2010 = 100) 1997-2015; data for Argentina are not available; for the 
following countries data are not available for the entire 
period: for Singapore data start in 1998, for Malaysia in 
1999, for Brazil and Russia in 2001, for India in 2002, for 
China and Mexico in 2005, for Poland in 2006, for 
Hungary in 2007, for the Czech Republic and Thailand 
in 2008, for Indonesia in 2009 and for Turkey in 2010.
Ratio: stockmarket value traded (% GDP)/ 
bank credit (% GDP)
1997-2014
NFC debt (% of GDP) 1997-2015
Household debt (% of GDP) 1997-2015; for the following countries data are not 
available for the entire period: for Russia data start in 
1998, for Indonesia in 2001, for China and Malaysia in 
2006, for India in 2007, for South Africa in 2008.
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Table A.2. Financialisation dimension: Overview 
Indicator
1997-2007 2008-2015 % Change 1997-2007 2008-2015 % Change 1997-2007 2008-2015 % Change 1997-2007 2008-2015 % Change 1997-2007 2008-2015 % Change 1997-2007 2008-2015 % Change
Argentina 0.74 n/a n/a 100.9 90.9 -10.0 n/a n/a n/a 0.24 0.05 -80.7 28.4 12.8 -55.0 4.1 5.1 23.3
Brazil 0.54 n/a n/a 59.8 61.3 2.4 9.1 17.7 0.93 0.55 0.56 2.1 27.2 39.9 46.8 9.1 20.0 119.4
Mexico 0.89 n/a n/a 55.9 59.7 6.7 3.1 1.9 -0.39 0.36 0.39 9.4 18.1 18.3 1.3 9.9 14.1 42.0
Czech Republic 0.86 n/a n/a 80.4 89.0 10.6 n/a 5.4 n/a 0.31 0.22 -29.2 59.1 54.3 -8.1 12.0 29.1 141.9
Hungary 0.94 n/a n/a 136.8 185.3 35.5 1.8 13.1 6.43 0.58 0.26 -56.2 55.6 91.9 65.3 13.1 32.9 151.8
Poland 0.84 n/a n/a 66.3 76.5 15.4 16.3 10.7 -0.34 0.27 0.27 0.5 30.8 41.4 34.3 11.1 33.4 199.9
Russia 0.76 n/a n/a 76.3 75.5 -1.0 37.7 18.0 -0.52 0.77 0.84 9.4 28.7 47.6 66.2 3.3 14.3 326.3
Turkey 0.71 n/a n/a 58.5 62.1 6.2 n/a 8.3 n/a 1.89 0.96 -49.1 21.1 38.7 83.2 4.2 18.1 329.8
South Africa 0.85 n/a n/a 72.1 78.6 9.0 41.9 3.9 -0.91 0.32 0.45 40.7 n/a 32.2 n/a n/a 39.8 n/a
China 0.37 n/a n/a 36.2 38.0 5.0 2.3 3.0 0.28 0.36 0.87 140.7 105.6 131.5 24.6 15.1 28.5 89.1
Hong Kong 0.94 n/a n/a 599.4 696.2 16.2 24.5 23.5 -0.04 1.59 3.48 119.1 111.5 175.5 57.5 56.0 59.0 5.4
India 0.55 n/a n/a 34.6 38.5 11.2 n/a 17.0 n/a 0.84 1.11 32.1 41.1 49.5 20.5 10.7 9.3 -12.7
Indonesia 0.62 n/a n/a 94.0 84.7 -9.9 7.9 2.8 -0.65 0.38 0.46 21.7 15.7 17.0 8.0 9.7 14.7 50.8
Malaysia 0.71 n/a n/a 106.1 106.6 0.5 3.8 14.9 2.95 0.33 0.40 21.3 61.1 61.0 0.0 53.7 61.2 13.9
Singapore 0.92 n/a n/a 682.4 727.3 6.6 10.4 7.6 -0.27 0.94 1.10 16.9 65.0 69.0 6.1 40.4 51.5 27.4
South Korea 0.71 n/a n/a 55.4 62.8 13.3 8.6 1.4 -0.84 1.08 1.39 28.9 91.5 104.2 13.9 58.6 78.9 34.7
Thailand 0.64 n/a n/a 92.4 90.8 -1.6 /a 3.4 n/a 0.33 0.45 37.0 71.6 47.1 -34.2 45.1 57.6 27.6
UK 1.00 n/a n/a 354.3 452.9 27.8 29.2 5.9 -0.80 0.64 0.58 -8.9 74.5 85.8 15.1 77.1 92.5 20.0
US 0.99 n/a n/a 92.3 114.5 24.0 21.7 7.8 -0.64 1.05 1.37 29.7 62.5 68.7 9.9 78.6 87.2 11.0
Household debt (% GDP)
Asset price volatilityForeign financial inflows  Financial deregulation Shift from MB to BB financial system NFC financialisation Household financialisation
Financial reform index (0-1) Foreign liabilities (stock, % GDP) Real house price volatility MB vs. BB activity indicator NFC debt (% GDP)
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